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lNsuRA,NcE-APPLICATION OF "INCONTESTABLE" CLAUSE IN A
LIFE INSURANCE PoLICY TO DEFENSES ArusING ouT oF APPLICATION
FOR REINSTATEMENT-An agreement to limit the contest period in
which other than specifically excepted defenses on the policy can be
raised by the insurer· is a common feature in a modem life insurance
contract.1 Such a clause gives the policy holder and the beneficiary a

1 A typical clause of this kind states: "This policy shall be incontestable after two years
from its date of issue except for nonpayment of premium." See Lanier v. New York Life
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guaranty against expensive litigation after the lapse of the specified
period while reserving to the insurer a reasonable opportunity to chal-.
lenge the validity of the policy.
When a policy containing an incontestable clause lapses for nonpayment of premium and is subsequently reinstated, a question arises as
to what effect the clause should be given. When the original contest
period had elapsed before the reinstatement, it is clear that defenses
arising out of the original application for insurance which have been
barred already should remain barred despite the reinstatement. This is
the result which the courts have reached. 2 Where the defense is one
growing out of the application for reinstatement, however, there has
been no such uniformity in result.
Some courts which have dealt with this proplem have held that the
incontestable clause applies only to the original contract and that the
reinstatement may be contested at any time. Others have held that the
incontestable clause continues to date from the original issue of the
policy and that once the stated period has elapsed, all contest is barred
despite a subsequent lapse and reinstatement. Still other courts have
held that on reinstatement the incontestable clause runs anew as to defenses arising out of the application for reinstatement.

I
In Alper v. New York Life Insurance Co. 3 the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy which contained a clause that it was to be incontestable
after two years brought an action to collect the proceeds. The company
defended on the ground that the insured's health had been misrepresented in the reinstatement application which had been made more
than two years after issue of the policy but less than two years before
the death of the insured. Judge Woodward, speaking for the court,
held that there were two distinct contracts, the original contract of insurance and a contract of reinstatement, adding:
"The plea attacks the contract of reinstatement on the ground
of fraud practiced by ... [the insured]. The incontestable clause
is a part of the restored contract. It is no part of the contract for the
Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 196 at 200, cert. den. 301 U.S. 693, 57 S.Ct. 795
(1937). For a discussion of what constitutes "contest," see 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §313
(1941).
2 Johnson v. Country Life Ins. Co., 284 Ill. App. 603, 1 N.E. (2d) 779 (1936); 45
C.J.S., Insurance §748 (1946) and cases there cited.
3 (D.C. Ill. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 956.
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restoration of the policy. The new contract for the reinstatement
of the policy is subject to be attacked for fraud." 4
Under this view, the original contract is the basis for an action by the
beneficiary and may be used to determine the rights of the parties because of the renewed life given it by the reinstatement. The company
is not contesting the contract of insurance but is contesting the reinstatement contract and if the reinstatement has been obtained by fraud
and misrepresentation, then it may be set aside at any time whatever
and the original contract will be invalid.5
Though such an interpretation prevents policy holders from cheating the insurer, it is submitted that the rule laid down by these courts
is a poor one from the standpoint of public policy. Incontestable clauses
are not only sanctioned by the law as valid and enforceable, but in
many states are mandatory. 6 It is
that most statutes, well as the
contract provisions themselves, in terms are directed at limiting contest
for fraud arising out of procurement of the original policy. Yet it is
clear that to hold there is no limit whatever to the time in which the reinstatement may be attacked is contrary to the intent of the legislature
and the parties themselves.

true

as

II
The theory that the incontestable clause continues to date from the
original issue of the policy despite an intervening forfeiture of the policy
caused by nonpayment of premiums is predicated on the language of
the standard reinstatement clause which has been construed to give the
insured an absolute right of reinstatement once he has paid the overdue
premiums and presented evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company. 7 Satisfaction of these two conditions is said to make reinst~tement by the company mandatory and it therefore has no right to enlarge
the terms upon which reinstatement may be obtained by imposing other
4 Ia. at 958. That the result in the Alper case has not been limited to the precise fact
situation there involved, see Chuz v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1145,
162 A. 395 (1932).
5New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 27 Ala. App. 113, 168 S. 200 (1936), cert. den.
232 Ala. 378, 168 S. 203 (1936); Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co., 129 S.C. 121, 123
S.E. 820 (1924). Contra, Smith v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, 321 Pa. 17
at 19, 184 A. 45 (1936).
61 APPLEMAN, lNsURANc.a §311 (1941).
7 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 191 Ark. 54, 83 S.W. (2d) 542 (1935) discussed in 49 HA.nv. L. Rav. 486 (1936); Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCray, 187 Ark.
49, 58 S.W. (2d) 199 (1933), judgment affd. 291 U.S. 566, 54 S.Ct. 482 (1934), rehearing den. 292 U.S. 600, 54 S.Ct. 627 (1934).
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conditions upon the insured or taking away legal defenses which he
already has. 8
These courts usually hold that there has been no new contract
formed between the parties but that there has been a "revival" of the
original contract:9 or a setting aside of the forfeiture. 10 Since all the provisions of the old contract are reinstated, the rights and obligations of
the parties thereto must then be measured by it. Moreover, the provision in terms limits contest from the date of "issue" and not from
the date of "issue or reinstatement." Therefore, it is asserted, since a
contract as written is to be most strictly construed against the party
writing it, this language must be interpreted literally.11
In answer to the argument that such a rule permits the insured to
effect reinstatement by fraud and deceit, it is said that the insurer has
plenty of time to check the truthfulness of the application before granting reinstatement and once it has done so there can be no objection to
making the decision binding.12
In a jurisdiction which allows the parties to provide that the contract
shall be incontestable for fraud from its date of issue, such an argument is indeed persua:sive.13 However, most courts would hold that
such a stipulation is not binding unless a reasonable period is allowed
for contest in order to preserve the requirement of good faith between
the parties.14
s Security Life Ins. Co. v. Leeper, 171 Ark. 77, 284 S.W. 12 (1926); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lovejoy, 203 Ala. 452, 83 S. 591 (1919). The Lovejoy case, decided
by the Alabama Supreme Court, should be considered in light of New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Ellis, 27 Ala. App. 113, 168 S. 200 (1936) where the intermediate appellate court reached
a result seemingly inconsistent with the Lovejoy case and the Alabama Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. See also, American Life Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Russell, 229 Ala. 467,
158 s. 307 (1934).
9IlJinois Bankers' Life Assn. v. Hamilton, 188 Ark. 887, 67 S.W. (2d) 741 (1934),
annotation, 94 A.LR. 1200.
10 Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCray, supra note 7. That the insurer is not put in
the same position by reinstatement through misrepresentation as he would have been in
had there been no forfeiture, see 3 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §1971 (1941).
·
11 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dandridge, 202 Ark. 112, 149 S.W. (2d) 45 (1941).
12 See lliinois Bankers' Life Assn. v. Hamilton, supra note 9; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, supra note 7.
13 Duvall v. Nat. Ins. Co. of Montana, 28 Idaho 356, 154 P. 632 (1916). Cf. Johnson v. Gt. Northern Life Ins. Co., 73 N.D. 572, 17 N.W. (2d) 337 (1945) holding that a
provision prohibiting contest from date of issue was valid despite dictum to the effect that
the incontestable clause ran anew after reinstatement in order to preserve good faith between
the parties in negotiations for reinstatement.
14 Reagan v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N.E. 217 (1905); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, (6th Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 634, affd. (6th Cir. 1931) 48 F.
(2d) 595, cert. den. 284 U.S. 624, 52 S.Ct. 10 (1931). See 44 MrcH. L. fuv. 308 (1945).
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III
In the recent case of Bellwood v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of
Iowa, 16 the Minnesota Supreme Court, faced with this problem as a
matter of first impression, adopted what is probably the most justifiable
position. The court in that case held that reinstatement of a life insurance policy after forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums by compliance with the conditions set out in the original policy, was a continuation of the old contract rather than the making of a new one. The court
went on to say that, although the incontestable clause in the original
policy had expired, the only just and fair rule was the one holding that
on reinstatement the incontestable clause ran anew as to defenses arising
out of the application for reinstatement.16
As the court pointed out in the Sellwood case, this view has been ·
adopt~d by most courts regardless of whether they find reinstatement
to be a continuation of the old contract or the creation of a new one.
Thus in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Galhraith17 the assignee
of a life insurance policy containing a two year incontestable clause
brought an action after the death of the beneficiary to recover the proceeds of the policy. The company sought to show that there was
fraud in securing the· reinstatement and that less than two years had
passed since that time. The lower court refused to admit such evidence,
but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed declaring that the reinstatement created a new contract and therefore the incontestable clause
ran anew. 18 The court went on to say:

"If this be ... [a new contract], then it must opera~ in the
future from the date of its reinstatement, and whatever might be
its original date, or howsoever long it may have run, yet it would
seem, by the force of necessary logic, to follow that the incontest15 (Minn.
16 Accord,

1950) 42 N.W. (2d) 346.
Liebowitz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., (N.Y. 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d)
663; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Burris, 174 Miss. 658, 165 S. 116 (1936); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Dreeben, (D.C. Tex. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 394, affd. (5th Cir. 1929) 29 F. (2d)
963; Teeter v. United Life Ins. Assoc., 159 N.Y. 411, 54 N.E. 72 (1899).
11 115 Tenn. 471, 91 S.W. 204 (1905).
1s Accord, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Waterman, (9th Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 990,
cert. den. 308 U.S. 592, 60 S.Ct. 122 (1939); State Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, (5th Cir.
1933) 62 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. 289 U.S. 746, 53 S.Ct. 690 (1933); Martin v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., (Mo. App. 1938) 113 S.W. (2d) 1025; Columbian
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 53 R.I. 334, 166 A. 809 (1933), rehearing den.
57 R.I. 468, 190 A. 787 (1937). In the latter case the company agreed to reinstate the
policy only after insured agreed to pay an additional premium because of high blood pressure. The court said that the terms of the reinstatement were the result of negotiations
between the parties.
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able clause would begin its new life with the date of the new contract."19
Other c01.1~ts holding that the clause runs anew have not even bothered to consider whether a new contract has or has not been created. 20
They have generally rested their conclusions not on any precise language in the contract, but by inference from the actions ,0f the parties
in reinstating a: policy containing such a clause and their conception of
how public policy may best be subserved.

Conclusion
From this analysis of the decided cases it is clear that whether the
court finds that reinstatement creates a new contract or is merely a
continuation of the old, will not be determinative as to the operation of the incontestable clause on defenses arising out of the application for reinstatement. Theoretically, however, it would seem that
the reinstatement, as its name implies, is more aptly described as a continuation of the old policy.21 The right to reinstate arises out of the
old contract and is one of the benefits given the insured by the original
policy. Premium rates remain unchanged, no new policy is ordinarily
issued, and the old contract remains the measure of the rights and obligations of the parties.
But the fact that the old contract is reinstated does not mean that
the incontestable clause should continue to date from the issue of the
original policy. The reason for the insertion of such a clause is to preserve the security of past transactions by preventing the company from
asserting the defense of fraud many years after the policy is issued and
when the insured, who is often the only witness the beneficiary may
rely on, is dead. Where the fraud is a new one, however, the clause
should be held to run anew, thereby giving the parties what they, in
effect, bargained for, namely, a limited period for contest after the validation of the policy.
Walter L. Dean, S. Ed.
19Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galbraith, 115 Tenn. 471 at 479, 91 S.W. 204
(1905).
20 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 169 Miss. 91, 152 S. 285 (1934); Lockett v. Nat.
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 372, 18 S.E. (2d) 550 (1942); Kanatas v. Home Life
Ins. Co. of Amer., 325 Pa. 93, 189 A. 293 (1937); Great Western Life Ins. Co. v. Snavely,
(9th Cir. 1913) 206 F. 20.
21 For a more complete discussion of whether or not a new contract was created, see
comment, 27 low.AL. R:sv. 146 (1941).

